Benita Ferrero-Waldner is the first Commissioner for External Relations of the European Union (EU) to take office after the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which set out a 'grand strategy' for EU foreign policy. She is also the first Commissioner to bear responsibility for the newly-created European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is included in the title of her position. How has Commissioner Ferrero applied the strategic orientation outlined in the ESS to the External Relations portfolio? Moreover, how does she conceive of threats, and the role of the EU in addressing them in its external relations? This article attempts to identify the security concept of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner. In order to do so, a series of her speeches are analysed with a view to ascertaining her perceptions of the security of the EU. This encompasses her assessment of the threats Europe faces, as well as her views on the utility of foreign policy tools to respond to these threats. 1 and disease, and failed or failing states', 3 to 'hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity'. 4 She defines these as challenges due to their threatening impact on populations, while she disregards their very diverse nature: 'economic crises, structural poverty ... internationally organised crime, massive migration, diseases and pandemics…are questions that have a direct impact on our security'. 5 The conflation of all these phenomena is justified on the basis of the centrality of the individual: Ferrero highlights her 'own personal commitment to the concept of human security', defined as 'putting people and their human rights, as well as the threats they face, at the centre of our policies'. 6 However, her listing of threats extends beyond the original concept of human security defined as 'freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations'. 7 Even the fight against terrorism is 'part of a broader agenda of Human Security '. 8 Ferrero's portrayal of threats reveals a benevolent notion of the human being: threats result from misperceptions or unfavourable circumstances, not from human will. She views terrorism as a 'radical movement reacting to rapid modernisation…wrongly perceived as "western-imperialist". Radical cultural changes, the lack of democracy and economic crises have led people to political estrangement and to seek refuge in the ideologies of hate'. 9 Ferrero asserts that 'failed states produce regional and international insecurity'. 10 This portrayal presents security threats as unintentional developments. In line with the ESS, Ferrero's discourse removes the link between the notions of 'threat' and 'state'. Labelling the proliferation of WMD as a threat implies that countries intent on developing such weapons pose a security risk; however, the countries in question are not held to be inherently threatening. Only 'failed states', deprived of leadership, are explicitly described as security threats.
The human security concept presented by the Commissioner highlights the interconnectedness of threats, and consequently of their remedies: 'By promoting human rights and democracy, fighting poverty, confronting the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons and encouraging economic development we are tackling inequalities and potential environmental, migration and conflict threats'. 11 EU actions to tackle specific threats help to address other problems: 'strengthened judicial, police and border co-operation not only helps combat organised criminal groups, suppliers of illegal weapons, but also terrorists'; 'health and security mechanisms are equally effective against natural pandemics and bio-terrorism '. 12 However, the Commissioner's security concept is not restricted to the notion of human security. Economics constitute a central element in her security equation. She considers developments likely to imperil the international economic standing of the EU as threats, which departs from the idea that security is about protecting human populations from physical existential dangers. For Ferrero, economic might can constitute a security threat: 'with the technological rise of China the [Asian] economies may [move] to more intense competition and thereby heat the political environment'. 13 Here, power is not military but economic. Ferrero highlights that economic competition translates into political tensions: 'The economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns…that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to…dominate the region both politically and economically'. 14 Asia is central to Ferrero's security views based on considerations of demographics, economic growth and investment: Asia is 'not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rates and the highest rates of spending for Research and Development', which will place this continent 'at the centre stage of the world in the 21 st century'. 15 China and India are regarded as potential future challenges to the EU due to their increasing economic weight. For Ferrero, the prediction that China's research expenditure will equal the EU's by 2010 qualifies as a threat. 16 At the level of discourse, Ferrero's adoption of human security bears substantial institutional consequences. By emphasising the interrelations between multifaceted threats and the EU actions to tackle them, she enhances the importance of policies under her remit. She 'securitises' a large portion of Community external action geared to tackle environmental dangers, pandemics, human rights or migration, whose security relevance had not been previously established.
Europe's External Actions as Instruments
Ferrero's discourse emphasises the use of tools of EU foreign policy rather than its guiding principles. She presents actions in virtually all areas of Community competence as tools to accomplish political ends: 'economic, trade, environmental, social, and development policy'. 17 For the Commissioner, the EU's added value as an international actor resides in its extensive toolbox: 'there is hardly any other political actor in possession of such a wide spectrum of instruments, including in the domains of trade, finance, energy and justice '. 18 Ferrero's toolbox  includes  'development  assistance…election  monitoring, anti-personnel landmines and light  weapons' 19 ; 'conflict prevention and civilian  crisis  management  … demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants'. 20 Ferrero also regards the establishment of contractual relations as tools: the Association Agreement with Mercosur is an 'instrument to support…integration efforts'. 21 The same is true for humanitarian assistance, 22 the ENP, or enlargement: 'enlargement has traditionally been our most effective foreign policy instrument '. 23 Closely linked to the political 'instrumentalisation' of external policies is their 'securitisation'. This shows the influence of the ESS, which enabled the Commission to highlight the security relevance of many of its activities. Ferrero envisions the production of security by non-military means: 'the framing of a policy with our partners encompassing a multiplicity of policy domains which displays a long-term stabilising effect'. 24 Security is achieved by '"exporting" stability in order not to "import" instability' 25 Aid granted to third-countries enhances the security of the EU: 'the structural modernisation [of the Middle East] is absolutely decisive -also for our own security'. 26 The promotion of democracy is justified with an ultimate security aim: 'the best long-term protection for our security is the democratisation of regions in crisis and the resolution of violent conflicts'. 27 Ferrero holds trade policy to have 'an important security policy dimension'. 28 The security rationale is most explicitly acknowledged in the ENP, a 'geo-strategically key project' 29 through which the EU 'gains improved security' 30 and 'pursues its geostrategic interest in expanding the zone of stability, security and prosperity'. 31 Ferrero boldly states that the ENP 'is a security policy'. 32 EU operations in the region are presented as manifest security policy tools: with the EU border mission in Moldova, the intention is 'to contribute to the political resolution of the conflict. The Themis-Mission in Georgia has a similar…goal'. 33 Ferrero believes that the ENP 'strengthens the role of the EU in the resolution of "frozen conflicts", such as that in Transdnistria and in the South Caucasus. The EU cannot tolerate "failing states" in its vicinity'. 34 Contractual relations with third-countries are used as a critical tool for producing security. Through its 'global network of detailed contracts', the EU is in the process of 'building a new multilateral system'. 35 Conditionality stands out in this context: 'the EU gains because our partners sign up to stronger commitments on the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, and to the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts'. 36 The rationale of the ENP is presented as an exchange: 'in return for their…steps to strengthen the rule of law…we offer our neighbours new opportunities '. 37 'Multilateralism' is one of Ferrero's most recurrent themes. While the ESS presents 'effective multilateralism' as one of its key terms, it fails to define this notion. Thus, Ferrero's speeches help to flesh out this concept. One of its core components is the centrality of the UN: 'the UN lies at the heart of the multilateralism we espouse'. 38 The benefit of this framework consists of its legitimacy: 'only multilateral co-operation in the framework of the UN can confer the degree of legitimacy necessary for efficient international action'. 39 However, the system as it stands is suboptimal. First, it needs to be adapted: effective multilateralism 'means … reforming and strengthening the United Nations and its subsidiary organisations as the basis of the multilateral system'. 40 Secondly, it necessitates close co-operation with the US: 'effective multilateralism can only function really if it is based in a strong transatlantic partnership '. 41 Significantly, the Commissioner's discourse reveals uneven expectations of EU influence. Established EU activities such as aid or election monitoring are presented in a triumphal tone: 'our humanitarian aid programmes are first class'. 42 Ferrero points out that 'the EU played a very positive role in assisting [Ukraine] to overcome the crisis late last year' 43 ; 'the EU presence on the ground [in the Palestinian elections] was highly effective and visible'. 44 Also, the use of political conditionality has yielded convincing accomplishments: 'Morocco and Jordan have committed themselves to far-reaching reforms'. 45 In contrast, Ferrero presumes only a modest impact on conflicts situations. In the Middle East conflict, Ferrero limits the EU's role to that of creating the conditions for peace: 'we…need to work with both the new Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority on creating the conditions for a successful Gaza disengagement'. 46 In her remarks on nonproliferation, her depiction of the global environment is bleak: 'there is growing mistrust, unpredictability and uncertainty in the international arena'; 'the current international environment is not conducive to negotiating new multilateral legally binding instruments'. 47 The strength of the EU resides in the non-coercive use of its instruments. Coercive instruments such as sanctions are rarely mentioned: their utility still needs to be optimised: 'we need to learn…and use our mix of carrots and sticks coherently'. 48
Conclusion
Ferrero's understanding of the EU's external action displays two notable features: the wideranging 'politicisation of instruments' and the 'securitisation' of its policies. External actions are policy instruments, and most of them can be used to enhance security. This approach mirrors her conception of security: if those developments which imperil human security qualify as threats, it follows that the EU external action is largely security-relevant. The 'instrumentalisation' and 'securitisation' of Community policies has major institutional implications. Ferrero's discursive focus on security reflects a preoccupation for citizens' concerns which departs from the EU's traditional image as an entity driven by economic interests. Significantly, by emphasising its security relevance, the Commissioner enhances the External Relations portfolio.◊ * This article is based on Clara Portela, Community Policies with a Security Agenda: The Worldview of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper Series 2007 (10), San Domenico di Fiesole: RSCAS, 2007. 1 This piece is based on speeches by Commissioner Ferrero from October 2004 to June 2006. The method employed is the operational code analysis developed by Alexander George: see A. George, 'The 'operational code': a neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision making ', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 2, 1969 . For the application of the operational code method in the present article, see P. As the 2004/07 enlargement process winds down, the EU is now looking to European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a key framework for handling a range of problems and relationships along its new borders. The ENP programme enables the EU to offer its partners a range of incentives and cooperative mechanisms to solve various problems, all bound by an institutional framework that can be tailored to the needs of individual ENP countries. This essay attempts to provide a preliminary evaluation of the prospects of ENP based on the contributions to a forthcoming volume on the topic. 1 A few caveats are in order. First, such an evaluation can vary widely depending on the policy domain and ENP partner being evaluated. The ENP currently involves up to 16 partners 2 with seven major policy sectors to be covered (with each sector covering several sub-policy issues). 3 In addition, such an evaluation must be further qualified in light of the unfinished, even openended, nature of the ENP programme. ENP Action Plans have not been agreed with all ENP partners, and they are at various stages of implementation. 4 Finally, it is quite likely that, aside from the EU, other major factors such as globalisation, competing powers (the US and Russia), or competing institutions (the UN and NATO) may play an indirect role in shaping ENP.
These issues aside, a few preliminary thoughts can be offered. Overall, ENP is intended to be a two-way relationship. For the EU, the ENP is expected to advance the EU's foreign policy objectives; move relations with certain countries beyond cooperation to integration; upgrade the scope and intensity of political cooperation; encourage reform and reduce trade barriers; resolve outstanding issues; define priorities; introduce a new financial instrument; increase existing funds, and provide technical assistance. 5 From the perspective of the ENP partners, virtually all would like greater access to the internal market, a lowering of barriers with the EU, and better management of certain bilateral problems. In this sense they are hoping for something better than the EU's previous frameworks for dealing with such issues (such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or the Euro-Med Programme), but cannot yet expect the promise of accession to the EU. This two-way relationship, however, is in principle conditioned on 'good behaviour' on the part of ENP partners, not the EU itself. Such good behaviour manifests itself primarily as the political conditionality clause: support for democracy and human rights. As nearly all ENP partners do not respect democracy (as understood by the EU), and most if not all have serious human rights issues, a first major challenge for the EU is to determine whether the central functional problems covered by the ENP programme -particularly those involving security and market access -will ever be served if strict political conditionality is actually imposed on the ENP partners. The EU will almost certainly have to subordinate political conditionality to other problems when dealing with most if not all of the ENP partners. Similarly, the EU will also face pressures to subordinate friendly relations with ENP partners to certain aspects of the EU-Russian relationship, particularly in the area of energy security. 6 The EU's reluctance to play a more direct role in Russia's gas pricing dispute with Ukraine shows how difficult it will be to find the right balance between ENP partners and outside parties. Similarly, its willingness to deal with ENP outsiders (such as Kazakhstan) that also violate norms of democracy and human rights while holding ENP partners (such as Belarus) to a higher standard also calls into question the EU's actual priorities in foreign policy.
Looking at the specific policy tools/rules found within the ENP plan, the EU similarly drew upon the 'report card' approach of past accession negotiations to assess where ENP partners now stand on certain policies. 7 However, again there is a major disconnect between institutional/normative legacy and potential functional/instrumental application. First, the EU could virtually dictate the terms of past accessions, yet ENP partners are not currently offered this major incentive for their good behaviour. In fact, the reverse may be true: they may see ENP as a way for the EU to prevent further enlargements, a view that does have some truth to it. Second, conditional market access may not be enough of an incentive (as compared to accession) to encourage cooperative behaviour, except for states (such as Ukraine) that may eventually be able to join the EU. 8 Here the lack of a firm 'final reward' (like accession) means ENP must function as an on-going process of negotiations with no clear end point if full access to the single market is not allowed (although incremental and/or sectoral incentives may be useful). As a general rule, open-ended talks are inherently more difficult than those where a clear point of closure is possible. Third, the issue of differentiation will be far more important in ENP as compared to the accession process. ENP partners differ widely across a range of dimensions, economic and political, and the EU will have little choice but to treat them accordingly. Thus the EU could be very mistaken (that is, unduly optimistic) about its prospects for the ENP, which might therefore limit the utility of the programme.
Overall, then, these factors require analysts to apply a range of possible measures of 'effectiveness' to determine the true potential for the ENP programme. At the macro level one can compare ENP to past history/policies and ask whether ENP overall is likely to do better with specific problems than previous arrangements. At a more micro level we can assess the degree of support by ENP partners -their sense of 'ownership' or legitimacy regarding the ENP plan. Thus, ENP might be seen as a success with one country and/or policy sector(s) and as a failure with others. Time horizon can be important as well: what may be deemed a shortterm success may be judged quite differently in the long run. While several EU neighbours, for example, are struggling to replace authoritarian governments with democratic structures and moving away from command to free market economies, EU member states are likely to give their partners credit for even small steps in the right direction. Once this initial transition has been completed, however, the EU can be expected to be much less lenient.
Matters of assessment become far more complicated at the sectoral level.
Economic relations between the EU and its ENP partners tend to be less hierarchical and largely based on mutual agreement and cooperation. ENP partners are treated as equals and asked to emulate EU member states to create prosperity, although not to the same degree as acceding countries. 9 Here there is a real possibility of negotiating a wide variety of 'package deals' on conditional market liberalization between the EU and the ENP partners, though this may take some time. In the environmental sector, however, cooperation is not a priority and there is a need for 'detailed rules and procedures for cooperation, and binding obligations and detailed review mechanisms' -greater structural sophistication -than in the energy sector. 10 In the energy sector there appears to be rough parity between the EU and its neighbours, due to mutual vulnerabilities and complementary interests. Cooperation here however will face strict limits until the EU succeeds in diversifying its energy supplies (particularly natural gas) beyond the Russian sphere of influence. 11
As noted above, most difficult of all is the realm of 'shared values': democracy and human rights, where stringent political conditionality might prevent useful functional cooperation in other issue areas. 12 Moreover, here one can observe significant variance, depending upon the specific countries and institutional framework involved. In the Western Balkans, for example, where the ENP does not apply, 'post-war reconstruction, state-and institutionbuilding come first.' 13 In the South, which is subject to the ENP, the EU seems hesitant to forcefully pursue democratization policies and instead emphasises economic reform. Similarly, with ENP security relations, these are not highly institutionalised and vary widely in terms of priorities, thus increasing the likelihood of defection. In the case of Georgia, for example, ENP premises regional stabilisation on economic and social levers, and political dialogue is clearly secondary. 14 And in the ENP overall, security ranks higher than cross-border mobility, while cultural and educational cooperation is subsumed well below other EU foreign policy concerns. 15 There is also a clear asymmetry between ENP partners and the EU in the security realm and the broad terms of partnership are set by the Commission. 16 However, some degree of 'soft' security cooperation is possible through the Political Dialogue and Justice/Home Affairs (JHA) aspects of ENP, as well as a potential for ENP partners to participate in security operations outside of their own territory. 17 Whether these arrangements will hold up in the event of an actual security crisis remains to be seen.
Beyond an assessment of ENP partners and sectoral cooperation, we might ask whether ENP activities should be viewed as a new form of regional cooperation. Most of the EU's other cooperative arrangements (the Europe Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and Stabilisation and Association Agreements) are largely bilateral in orientation and do not represent real multilateral cooperation. However, ENP combines bilateral and regional approaches to EU relations with neighbouring countries. An example is the South Caucasus, where the EU has sought to negotiate separate Action Plans with each of the three South Caucasus states in parallel. There is also some evidence of a regional focus with respect to ENP environmental governance as illustrated by the Danube Black Sea Task Force, the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 18 as well as the possibility of greater multilateral/regional cooperation in the security realm. There is certainly far more scope for regional cooperation through the ENP; such a move beyond currently existing programmes may greatly increase the EU's leverage in dealing with interconnected regional problems (e.g. conflict resolution, energy, transportation).
Regarding the short-term versus long-term impact of ENP, our initial evaluation is that, due to intraregional heterogeneity an uneven pattern of progress is likely. But it is by no means certain whether ENP can lead to better governance and improved economic performance absent the powerful lure of membership. Incentives for change, it appears, will largely have to come from the economic field; good standing in the ENP could become a valuable economic asset for ENP states if it becomes a 'credible commitment device' for assuring investors regarding the country's progress with economic reforms. 19 Given the absence of mention of several trouble spots in the ENP Country Reports, the EU's influence in the security realm will almost certainly be limited, making socio-economic cooperation all the more important. And of course differing priorities within, and disputes between, EU member states and ENP participants themselves, such as the Israeli-Hezbollah-Lebanon military conflict of mid-2006, can seriously challenge the EU's capacity to use (mostly) soft power incentives to encourage good behaviour and regional integration among its neighbouring states.
But, it is premature to paint too bleak a picture of the ENP project, particularly for the long run. It is certainly possible for cooperation in areas that have seen some success (like JHA or energy) to 'spill-over' to sectors that are struggling at the moment. Successful cooperation in individual sectors may also improve overall relations from the 'bottom up' (citizens, NGOs, and firms) rather than from the 'top down' (government representatives) alone. Even at the government level ENP certainly raises the prospects of more activity with these important neighbouring states: more meetings, more financial aid, more agreements, more goals. And the framework may go further in the long term by adding more subtle socialisation and normative incentives onto the existing structure of material incentives (trade and aid) that provides the backbone of the ENP Action Plans. This of course will take time, while the EU itself will be preoccupied with the aftershocks of the 2004/07 enlargement process and the need to re-assess the Constitutional Treaty issue (which had mentioned developing a 'special relationship' with neighbouring countries). The EU will also face continued competition from the US and Russia in promoting its vision for the ENP partners, competition that may undermine the coherence and effectiveness of ENP entirely.
Thus, a successful ENP could offer a new framework for gradual change, similar to the CSCE process during Cold War, focused on longterm, mutually-beneficial cooperation by holding governments to their word through benchmarking and scorecards rather than threatening to break off relations or use military force. This could be especially important in dealing with Muslim countries that may be feeling under threat owing to the pressures of globalisation in general and America's war on terrorism in particular. And in the final analysis the EU has no other choice but to engage with its neighbouring states, whether through the ENP framework or otherwise. Geography is at least partly destiny, and the EU's bordering states are not going to disappear. Nor are they likely to remain as stable as the EU seems to hope. The ENP programme may ultimately attain greater prominence by virtue of as yet unforeseen exogenous stresses forced upon it rather than through the innocuous diplomatic niceties outlined in the various ENP Action Plans. As is always the case in EU foreign policy, incremental steps are very important, as are learning-bydoing and the symbols and rhetoric involved in creating the EU's global identity. ENP, like most EU foreign policy initiatives, certainly upholds these traditions while moving the EU ever so The EU's policies in its new neighbourhood are coming under increasing scrutiny as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is developed and as ENP Action Plans are put in place. The countries of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) make frequent appearances on the EU's external relations agenda; ENP Action Plans were agreed in November 2006, and an EU Special Representative for the area was appointed in 2003. The South Caucasus do not border the EU yet, 1 but the region is just across the Black Sea from Romania and Bulgaria. Despite the regional oil wealth, the countries are characterised by under performing economies, weak democracies, poverty, and widespread corruption. The region is the site of three unresolved internal conflicts over territory that remain key stumbling blocks for democratic and economic reform. The EU's role in the resolution of these 'frozen conflicts' is a test case not only for the ENP and associated action plans, but for the whole EU foreign and security policy project.
This article discusses some of the problems, and opportunities, faced by the EU as it attempts to step up its role in conflict settlement in the South Caucasus. Of course, the creation of a new postenlargement 'capabilities-expectations gap' 2 in EU foreign policy is far from desirable; nevertheless, the EU has the capabilities, the experience, and the resources to contribute to the settlement of these conflicts, and our expectation that it will is natural. Granted, the EU has undergone a challenging enlargement, and is operating under cumbersome treaty arrangements because of the failure to implement the Constitutional Treaty reforms. Yet if the organisation has progressed in terms of policies, resources and instruments since the Yugoslav crisis of 1991, should it not, in 2007, be playing a key role in the resolution of conflict in its own extended backyard?
The challenge of intractable conflicts
The territorial conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) are undoubtedly challenging for the EU. The conflicts have their roots in the break up of the USSR. In Georgia, while South Ossetia and Abkhazia were previously accommodated in the USSR as autonomous republics, neither wanted to be incorporated into the new Georgian state. The 1992-94 conflict in Abkhazia left thousands dead and 280,000 displaced, while the South Ossetian dispute of 1990-92 displaced 60,000 Ossetians. 3 Nagorno Karabakh is a longdisputed region of majority ethnic Armenians within Azerbaijani territory. Conflict re-erupted in 1988 when Soviet policy under perestroika allowed Armenian grievances to resurface. The war from 1992 to 1994 resulted in 20,000 casualties and over one million refugees. 4 All the disputed regions proclaimed their independence in 1991, and all are universally unrecognized internationally as sovereign states. While it may not be entirely accurate to describe the conflicts as 'frozen', 5 they are certainly in stasis. Despite international involvement in conflict resolution (the UN and OSCE in Georgia and the OSCE 'Minsk Group' in Nagorno Karabakh), little progress in resolving the disputes has been made since ceasefires were agreed in the early-mid 1990s. The breakaway regions have established parliaments, and their positions have become more entrenched.
Georgia's 'Rose Revolution' of November 2003 installed a pro-western government committed to reform. The formerly autonomous region of Ajara, with its economically important Black Sea port of Batumi, has been brought back under central government control, but this outcome is unlikely to be repeatable, and the authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain as defiant as ever. 6 The Georgian government's relationship with Russia has continued to deteriorate, increasing further the damaging impact of Russia's support of the breakaway regimes.
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is different because of its inter-state as well as internal elements, but is similarly intractable. Direct meetings between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2006 have not broken the deadlock.
Robert Kocharian, Armenia's president (and former leader of the Karabakh regime), is threatening to recognise the republic, and is pushing for inclusion of the Karabakh leadership at peace talks. The Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, refuses to have Nagorno Karabakh representation at the negotiating table, and maintains that the region belongs to Azerbaijan. There is evidence of increased military spending on both sides, and a real danger that war could resume between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the region. 7
With all the regions vying for independence rather than federal solutions, the EU has its work cut out for it. In December 2006, Nagorno Karabakh residents voted 98% in favour of independence. The South Ossetians did the same in November 2006. Back in 1999, Abkhazians backed independence, and more recently (March 2007) voted in parliamentary elections -the results of which were universally ignored, much to the chagrin of the de facto parliament. Clearly, current strategies by the international community based on the inviolability of borders are not lessening the desire for independence. Economic blockades imposed by the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and supported by the international community, are not persuading the regions to reconsider going it alone: all they do is encourage corruption and smuggling. 8 Humanitarian aid and economic support to the breakaway regions from international organisations is crucial for local residents, but also helps to sustain the status quo. 9 Stubborn breakaway regimes are a challenge -especially when they insist, as the Abkhaz foreign minister did in March, that 'our objective is to show everyone that we meet modern European standards'. 10 The Kosovo example has compounded this: the lesson is that if you call for independence for long enough, it will eventually be granted.
EU policies -and opportunities?
The EU has been a key aid donor to the South Caucasus countries since the 1990s, and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) came into force with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1999. The countries were belated additions to the European Neighbourhood Policy, and in this context now cooperate with the EU on a wide range of economic, development and political issues. The EU has had little impact on conflict resolution to date, but, as described in the ENP Action Plans, intends to step up its role in this area, by increasing diplomatic efforts and political support to the peace processes, intensifying dialogue, and raising the conflicts in EU-Russia political dialogue meetings. 11 EU cooperation with Georgia is more advanced than with Armenia and Azerbaijan, reflecting the new external priorities of the Georgian government. An EU Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST Themis) operated in Georgia from to 2005, and the EU Special Representative has had, since September 2005, a team of 20 staff based at the EC delegation in Tbilisi, providing a follow up service to the mission, and assisting with reform of the Georgian Border Guard service. 12 However, even in the case of Georgia, the EU's political profile in the country has been described as 'restrained and ad hoc', driven by crises instead of strategic choices. 13 The EU's cooperation with Armenia is problematic because of the country's close alliance with Russia, although the EU does have a delegation in Yerevan. While Armenia proclaims commitment to political and economic reform, there are signs that the EU has lost its initial appeal to the Armenian government. A security strategy adopted in February 2007 underlines Armenia's strategic partnership with Russia, and does not state EU membership as a foreign policy goal, contrary to a statement made by the Foreign Minister in 1999. 14 A waning of EU influence could have implications for the EU's desire to play a greater role in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
Economic cooperation with Azerbaijan is high on the agenda, yet the EU's influence with the Minsk Group seems paltry, and an EC delegation in Baku is still pending.
A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report written prior to the conclusion of the EU-Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan called for the EU to maximise its influence on human rights reform: the Azerbaijan regime has a poor human rights record, including a history of flawed elections, police torture and limited media freedom. 15 The organisation suggested wide consultation with the media and civil society, coordination with other organizations and the United States, and rigorous monitoring of the reform process. The agreed Action Plan prominently features the strengthening of democracy and protection of human rights, but falls short of adopting HRW recommendations.
The Azerbaijani authorities could be forgiven for believing that EU countries are more interested in their oil than in their human rights policy. EU engagement in the South Caucasus is significantly driven by the desire to diversify oil and gas supplies: Azerbaijan has oil wealth, and Georgia is important transit state for oil and gas. Energy cooperation features prominently in the ENP Action Plans, and there is considerable interest in the region among the EU business community. Austria is heading a consortium of companies planning the Nabucco pipeline project, bringing gas from the Caspian region to Europe via Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and possibly Iran. 16 Political support and economic backing of pipeline projects may not, however, be compatible with the EU's other pressing objectives in the region. The political settlement of long-running conflicts are not necessarily conducive with maintaining stability for foreign investment. Analysts have raised this as another reason why the Georgian prime minister may favour the status quo vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 17 The EU must get the balance right if it wants to avoid accusations of economic opportunism.
What more can the EU do to enhance its role in conflict settlement in the region? On taking up his role as second EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby suggested, in May 2006, that the EU could take on a peacekeeping role in Nagorno Karabakh if suitable progress in the settlement of the conflict was achieved. 18 There is certainly scope for more ESDP civilian and military missions in the region; however, the opportunity in 2005 to take over the OSCE Border Monitoring Mission in Georgia was lost, after its extension was vetoed by Russia. The EU favours a small advisory team based in the delegation rather than the deployment of a larger civilian force. However, the recent prosecution in Georgia of a North Ossetian man for WMD smuggling across the Russian-Georgian border underlines the importance of improving law enforcement and border security in South Ossetia. 19 Porous borders are also a problem in Nagorno Karabakh, and as in the case of Russia and Georgia, strained relations between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan make border security more difficult to maintain. The EU could step up its role in this area: not only by considering border monitoring missions, but by encouraging regional and inter-state cooperation.
The
Commission's December 2006 Communication on Strengthening the ENP admits that the policy has had little impact to date on the resolution of conflicts, and suggests that the EU be 'more active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peacemonitoring or peace-keeping efforts.' 20 The OSCE's predicament may present an opportunity for the EU to increase ESDP engagement. The OSCE has faced sustained hostility from the Russian government in recent years, and disagreement between participating states on reform of the organisation has left it 'in crisis.' 21 While the EU should not support the downgrading of the OSCE in the region, Russian opposition to the organisation allows the EU to grasp the nettle, and consider greater presence on the ground. This requires, however, the development of a firmer stance towards its most awkward neighbour.
Facing Russia?
The EU has to face up to a confrontation with Russia in order to play a more proactive role in the settlement of the conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan.
As the former European Commissioner for External Relations put it, 'the main victims of our failure to develop a better and more balanced relationship with Russia are its neighbours '. 22 The impact of Russian engagement and interference in the conflicts has been overwhelming negative. Russia has consistently supported the breakaway states: militarily, economically, and politically. The partiality of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia does not contribute positively to conflict settlement, but helps to maintain the status quo. The pro-Russian stance of the breakaway regimes is understandable.
As the USSR was disintegrating, it was Russia, not NATO or the EU, that provided basic needs and security guarantees to the citizens of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. 23 The de facto regimes remain threatened by the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Fostering trust between actors is crucial, and EU policy to support economic and social reform in the conflict areas, channelled through central government authorities, should contribute to this. More importantly, though, the EU has to increase its profile, and convince the people and leaders of the region that they have much to gain in greater cooperation with the EU.
Confronting Russia over its policy in the post-Soviet regions is no easy task, especially when EU member states disagree about how this should be done. Yet building consensus around a more robust policy towards Russia is crucial if the EU is serious about contributing to peace and security in its wider neighbourhood. After years of rhetoric, we can surely expect the EU and its member states to be capable of this.◊ The workshop emphasised the importance of refocusing the analysis on Mediterranean actors as protagonists of change and of developing studies on Islamist parties as potential EU partners in the democratisation of the region. The papers presented during the two-day session explored the internal and external dynamics at the heart of the recent transformations in the Maghreb and the Mashrek. The main contribution of the workshop was to look at the EU's postcolonial legacy and its normative power as potential explanatory factors of the process of democratisation, issues that have often been overlooked in previous academic debates which rather focused on the authoritarian nature of the regimes as an obstacle to democratisation.
In an effort to understand the EU's role in promoting democracy in the Mediterranean, the first panel dealt with its normative and discursive dimensions. Unpacking the EU's efforts at promoting democratisation, the paper presented by Michelle Pace (University of Birmingham) emphasised the EU's inherent paradoxes in light of its colonial past. One of these contradictions lies in the fact that democracy is conceived as a means for pursuing the EU's security objectives in the region. The EU's understanding of democracy which emphasises the importance of elections was seriously challenged by the Palestinian elections of January 2006 and the ensuing victory of Hamas. The EU's decision to freeze its aid to the Palestinian Authority reflects a very short-term focused and personalised view of the democratisation process, according to Pace. The EU's contradictions are also to be found in the EU's denial of its own Mediterranean past, as Dimitri Nicolaïdis (Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences de l'Homme, Aixen-Provence) pointed out. While projecting itself as a normative power in the region, it is puzzling that the EU, at the same time, refuses to recognise the inherited legitimacy, including border drawing and ensuing territorial conflicts, of its colonial past. Hence, the West never recognised its responsibility for the split of Palestine, nor for the Western Saharan conflict. This influences the uneasiness with which the EU is dealing with its Mediterranean partners, partly defined by the EU's dominant representation of Islam. Following up on this point and questioning traditional functionalist analysis in the study of the EU's democracy promotion, Frédéric Volpi (University of St Andrews) called for a new paradigm to analyse the rise of long-term trends and in particular political Islam. Customarily scrutinised through the linkage between modernisation and secularisation which are assumed to result in democratisation, there is in fact a crucial need for alternative narratives to explain change in the Middle East and North African region, notably the transformation of Islamic ideas of governance and related transnational features.
The democratic challenge in Palestine was the subject of the second panel which analysed the recent rise of Hamas and its implications for democracy. Examining the ascension to power of Hamas, Beverly Milton-Edwards (Queens University) underlined the challenge that political Islam appears to pose to Western notions of democratic governance. Indeed, despite having encouraged the Palestinians to hold democratic elections, the EU participated in the diffusion of chaos and frustration by suspending its aid, vital to the Palestinian Authority. Milton-Edwards nonetheless argued that the EU needs to recognise the new 'Palestinian Muslim polity' as a permanent and unalterable feature of the Palestinian political arena. Stressing the fact that the Hamas victory was the direct outcome of a true democratic process in Palestine, Riad Malki (Panorama) highlighted what in his view is the tremendous regression in the status of democracy which has occurred since. According to Malki, Hamas has negatively influenced the democratic experiment at the level of Palestinian citizens, institutions, and the Palestinian political system. Analysing the most recent Mecca agreement between Fatah and Hamas, Malki concluded that this is the result of a 'lowestcommon denominator' agreement in terms of Palestinian democracy, notably of pluralism and the rotation of power and governance structures.
Turning to the 'nouvelles donnes' in the Maghreb, the third panel examined the EU's postcolonial legacy in Morocco and Algeria. Assessing the French imperialist legacy, Pierre Vermeren (University of Sorbonne) demonstrated its differentiated impact on Algeria and Morocco. Whereas independence from France was seen as a restoration of the Monarchy after the Protectorate in Morocco, Algeria's independence was perceived as a revolution. Exploring this complexity at a deeper level and focusing on the issue of the Berber (Amazigh) movement in Morocco and Algeria, Michael Willis (Oxford University) similarly stressed the role played by the French in the emergence of the 'Berber myth'; the Berbers being perceived as more reliable by the French. Berberist groups today form an important part of the associational life in these two cases and hence serve to strengthen civil society -an objective which in theory is supported by the EU's democracy promotion efforts. But this cooperation is not easy, since the Berbers have often been accused of being the Trojan horse for Western interests. The last paper of this panel, presented by Hakim Darbouche (University of Liverpool) looked at the EU's colonial legacy and its influence on its relationship with Algeria. Here again, the 'colonial effect' shapes the EU's policies towards Algeria, notably the role of France which plays a perverse role in promoting democracy and contributes to the EU's mis-reading of the Algerian crisis.
The fourth and fifth panels looked closely at some of the key addressees of the EU's democracy promotion efforts. Amal Obeidi (University of Garyounis) provided a study of the 'temporary elite' phenomena in Libya. The 'temporary elites' were created by the regime and their composition was continuously changing according to the needs of the regime. Over the years, the regime managed to narrow down its structure and to make it more hierarchical. In the meantime, it has favoured the increasing role of the tribes in Libyan politics, which constitute an alternative source of its legitimacy. The importance of elite groups in the democratisation process was similarly stressed by Thomas Demmelhuber's study of reform actors in Egypt (University of Nuremberg-Erlangen). The 'Gamal group', a group of young Western-educated people who revolve around Mubarak's son, is amongst the groups with which the EU should reconsider its cooperation. Looking at the 'variety versus capability gap' that characterises reform actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Kifaya, Demmelhuber argued that these groups have increased (variety), but that most of them suffer from weaknesses in influencing the reform process in Egypt (capability). It is on this double dimension that the EU should focus its action, by supporting this variety of actors, and also by helping them to increase their capabilities. Investigating the 2005 Judges' revolt that occurred during the most recent 2005 elections in Egypt, Sarah Wolff (London School of Economics) highlighted the EU's inability to seize the window of opportunity which opened in terms of its 'rule of law' promotion agenda. Wolff reflected on how the EU, due to an incremental and path-dependent policy-making approach, has been unable to promote rule of law in Egypt and in the Mediterranean. Worse, the EU is in a process of securitising the promotion of democracy through law, by developing in parallel an external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which endangers the EU's efforts in this process.
The emergence of new actors in the Maghreb's democratisation process poses new challenges to the EU. Traditionally, in the democratisation literature, opposition actors are depicted as united under the same goal of removing the authoritarian leader despite their ideological differences. Francesco Cavatorta (Dublin City University) emphasised that unity amongst opposition actors is not automatic and that, in the case of Morocco, ideologies are still an important factor differentiating these agents. The lack of cooperation between the various Moroccan opposition actors is in turn due to fundamental disagreements between liberal and secular movements over their long-term vision for society. It is in this context that Eva Wegner (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) and Miquel Pellicer-Gallardo (Humboldt University) offered an analysis of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and its relationship with its founding organisation the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR). Recently, the PJD has been able to gain some autonomy from the MUR, at the same time 'moderating' its ideological stance, which makes it a possible partner for external actors like the EU. Exploring the relationship between Tunisia and the EU, Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle (University of Southern Denmark) pointed out the importance of tribal identities in processes of democratisation: ignoring such a crucial basis of the Tunisian social structure impedes EU efforts at supporting reforms along the democratisation path. Drawing on transition and post-colonial literature, Brieg Powel (University of Exeter) analysed the nature of the Tunisian regime, one that is influenced by the divide between Francophiles and Arab-Islamists. Put into the perspective of EU-Tunisian relations, the EU's reluctance to engage with Islamists was stressed as well as the increasing emphasis on the notion of security in EU's democracy promotion agenda.
The last panels focused on democratisation processes in the Levant region. André Bank (Philipps University Marburg, with Morten Valbjørn, University of Southern Denmark) presented a paper on the role of Islamists in Jordan and their influence on regional dynamics by contrasting two periods, post-1958 and post-2006. Drawing on the concept of the 'Old Arab Cold War' developed by Kerr, Bank and Valbjørn argued that today's regional order can be seen as a 'New Arab Cold War', with some similarities and differences from the 'Old' version. The more contemporary form is notably characterised by a cleavage between the regime and the society and influenced by Islamist actors. Peter Seeberg (University of Southern Denmark) investigated the Hezbollah phenomenon, the 'shia revival' in Lebanon and the implications that the ongoing political turmoil has on the EU's democratisation possibilities in the region. The 2006 war exposed the polarisation of Lebanese society but also the rise of Iran as a non-Arab regional power. In this context, EU's institutions and decision-making processes severely constrain EU action. The combination of the weakening of the Arab states and inefficiency in the EU's foreign policy machinery leaves policy initiatives in the hands of Hezbollah and Iran. Karim Knio (ISS The Hague) concluded the panel sessions by arguing that beneath the current Lebanese stalemate, the existing 'nested games' envisage a multitude of scenarios that will weaken Hezbollah's political options in the future. Such situations will push Hezbollah to strive to preserve its status in the Lebanese political scene.
The variety and the richness of the papers presented at the workshop were reflected in a public conference that took place in the late afternoon of the first day of the workshop. Following a presentation about the Danish Arab initiative by Eva Raabymagle, Head of Section from the Department for the Middle East and North Africa at the Danish Foreign Ministry, researchers and the wider audience engaged in a discussion on options for the EU's democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, as well as on the need for a rethinking of the EU's understanding of the notion of democracy. Beverly Milton-Edwards argued that it is not enough to launch 'dialogues' with Mediterranean partners, but that the EU should reflect about who is actually listening to Europe, who Europe should talk to and who should listen to Europe.◊
CALL FOR PAPERS: 'The European Union in International Affairs'
A GARNET Conference, Egmont Palace, Brussels, 24-26 April 2008
The Institute for European Studies (IES) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (VUB), the Institut d'Études Européennnes (IEE) at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), the UN University programme for Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), and the Egmont -Royal Institute for International Relations invite papers for the GARNET Conference 'The European Union in International Affairs', to be held in Brussels on 24-26 April 2008.
The Conference will provide a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas among the growing number of scholars that take an interest in understanding the interface of EU and international politics and law. The Conference will also attempt to foster exchange between the academic and policy communities, especially through keynote addresses by senior policymakers and a number of 'policy link' panels featuring a mixture of academics and practitioners. In total, we expect up to 150 conference participants.
To this end, we invite in particular papers that cover one or more of the four conference themes:
1. The EU, the UN and Global Governance: Theories, Institutions, Processes, Actors As a global actor, the EU is embedded in an international framework, including multilateral institutions and organisations. Contributions may address such topics as the role of the EU in treaty-based regimes, in international organisations or in more informal institutions such as the G8, and the ways in which these institutions form and influence the EU as an international actor. They may also explore in more detail the processes and actors that shape the EU's role in global governance, including the implementation of the EU's international obligations. In general, explorations of the institutions, processes, (legal) competences, decisions and actors present in EU-global governance relations are appreciated.
The EU in a Globalizing World: The Security and Economic Dimensions
Exploring the distinct, yet related policy fields of security and economics promises to help improve our understanding of the conditions of the EU's role in a globalised world in different policy areas.
• Security: Security considerations include the formulation of EU strategies to deal with different threats as well as developments in the field of European Security and Defence Policy. Relevant security issues include global terrorist activity, conflictresolution, non-proliferation, security assistance and support for reform, and peace-building efforts in various parts of the world, including on the EU's new borders. They in particular cover the nexus between security and development and between security and energy supply. • Economy: The EU has a very significant role to play in global economic activity and policy. While the European Commission has the leading role in the area of international trade, EU member states remain the prime actors in important other international economic contexts (e.g. World Bank, IMF), which results in a complex political and legal mix of shared EU and Member States' competences.
The Interplay between EU Member States, the EU and International Affairs
The vertical dimension in developing an EU outlook on international law and politics raises various questions. For example, what is the impact of the EU's internal multi-level order on the EU as a foreign policy actor and the formulation of "EU" foreign policy? How can 
's external activities be monitored and controlled? What role do various foreign policy strategies of EU member states play (e.g. isolationist, Atlanticist, protectionist, multilateral/ internationalist)? What are the driving forces of different strategies and approaches (threat perception, preferences, etc.)? How and to what extent do the activities of individual member states shape or contravene a common EU approach in international affairs? To what extent is the EU bound by international law in its international relations?
The EU, Interregionalism and the Challenge to Multilateralism
The EU interacts with other world regions and major players. As such, it promotes cooperation within and between different regions as well as with other countries, including under the new EU Neighbourhood Policy. What is the prospect of inter-regional cooperation fostered by the EU both with relevant formal organisations (e.g. APEC/ASEAN, NAFTA, the AU, UNECE, OSCE, MERCOSUR) and more informal groupings? What are the EU's strategies for dealing with other regions and actors, how efficient and effective are they, and which (legal) instruments are used? To what extent do these strategies challenge broader, global cooperation? What can we learn from these interactions regarding the analyses of EU foreign policy and European integration? Please submit your abstract, of no longer than one page, by email to conference@ies.be or through the conference website at www.ies.be/conference2008, which will be active by the beginning of July.
Limited travel grants will be available to cover part of the cost of participation of junior researchers from disadvantaged countries. Details will be available on the conference website, which will also contain further relevant information.
